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Zonal Marking's Top 20 Teams of the Decade


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Zonal Marking’s 20 teams of the decade – in full

March 28, 2010

After twenty trips down memory lane, this series has finally come to an end. Below are the twenty sides chosen, in descending order, to represent the 2000s in tactical terms.

Choosing the sides was a difficult task. The intention was not to choose the twenty ‘best’ sides, but to choose twenty sides who were somehow interesting tactically, or those who made a significant impact upon the game.

The France side of Euro 2004, the Australia side of World Cup 2006 or the Bologna side of 2001/02 will hardly go down as great sides, but were fascinating to study from a tactical point of view. The order is subjective and not based upon any strict criteria, but hopefully the detail about each individual side will cause more interest than the order itself.

A few interesting things come out of it – how few three-man defences there are, how few 4-4-2s there are, how three of the top five sides occasionally played strikerless shapes, that Cafu, Gilberto, Thierry Henry, Lucio and Daniel Alves all feature in three sides on the list.

There are other successful sides not on the list – Italy’s World Cup-winning side, Inter’s successful side of the second half of the decade, and a couple of Bayern Munich sides. The list could also rightfully be seen as focusing too narrowly on Western Europe and international tournaments, as fans of the Boca Juniors side of 2003/04, or the recent Shakhtar Donetsk side would point out.

But hopefully this has been an interesting feature – attention now turns to the great sides of the 2010s…

20) Sevilla, 2005-07: For winning the UEFA Cup twice in succession, showing that a traditional 4-4-2 can still work at the highest level when adapted to suit the players at hand.

19) France, Euro 2004: For trying an innovative shape, but ultimately demonstrating that football isn’t about trying to cram your best players into the same team.

18) Australia, World Cup 2006: For outlining the value of packing the midfield by playing a 3-6-1 shape, and dominating possession against better sides.

17) Bologna, 2001/02: For showing how successful a ‘big man holding the ball up’ can be, and for varying their formation but keeping the same tactics.

16) Senegal, World Cup 2002: For shocking the world with their victory over France, and for playing physical but technically excellent counter-attacking football.

15) Brazil, 2007-09: For playing a fascinating 4-2-3-1 / 4-4-2 diamond / 4-2-2-2 shape, and providing one of the most interesting tactical debates of modern times.

14) Milan, 2002-07: For their two Champions League victories, and for playing up to four talented playmakers in the same midfield by reintroducing the deep-lying playmaker.

13) Chelsea, 2004-06: For taking the Premiership by storm and showing how successful the 4-3-3 shape can be by occupying opposition full-backs.

12) Brazil World Cup 2002: For winning the World Cup by playing adventurous football despite fielding seven relatively defensive players in an unusual 3-4-3 shape.

11) Valencia, 2001-04: For winning La Liga twice and the UEFA Cup, and establishing the 4-2-3-1 as a creditable formation.

10) Roma, 2000/01: For demonstrating how successful a three-man defence can be, and for providing a great debate between two players upfront.

9) Arsenal, 2001-04: For two incredible title victories by playing wonderful football in a loose 4-4-2 that became a 4-2-3-1.

8) Czech Republic, Euro 2004: For having more attacking options within the first XI than any other side in the decade.

7) Spain, Euro 2008: For playing their way to success through tiki-taka.

6) Bayer Leverkusen, 2001/02: For coming so close to three trophies and setting the agenda for how European football tactics would evolve throughout the decade.

5) Roma, 2005-07: For hinting at the future of football – strikerless formations.

4) Porto, 2002-04: For achieving the most remarkable club feat of the decade – coming from nowhere to win the Champions League.

3) Manchester United, 2006-09: For an astonishing run of trophies, and for playing different systems and utilising their players so well.

2) Barcelona, 2008/09: For winning every tournament they entered, for playing incredible football, and for being flexible at both ends of the pitch.

1) Greece, Euro 2004: For the biggest shock in the history of football.

http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/03/29/gre...o-2004-tactics/

Teams of the Decade #1: Greece, Euro 2004

March 29, 2010

This Greek side achieved perhaps the most astonishing thing in the history of international football. There have been one-off shocks, games that went against the favourites because of a particular set of circumstances. USA 1-0 England in 1950. Senegal 1-0 France in 2002. But those things can happen; shocks in football happen because it’s such a low-scoring game, and dominance doesn’t always equal goals.

But never before has a team so unfancied gone onto win a major international tournament. Available at odds of up to 250/1 and having never won a tournament game in their history, Greece’s march to wining Euro 2004 was unquestionably the tactical achievement of the decade.

Remember them as negative, defensive, cycnical and unimaginative if you like, but it’s interesting that this only became the prevailing mood when Greece actually looked like winning the thing. In the opening game, where they beat Portugal, they were widely praised for their football. Slick passing, plenty of players attacking and generally positive play, the first game upset was treated like the Senegal victory two years previously, a great start to a tournament.

Admittedly, Greece didn’t play quite such wonderful football in the knock-out stages. But you have to marvel at quite how effective their strategy was:

Quarter-final against France (the holders) – won 1-0, header from a right-wing cross.

Semi-final against Czech Republic (the best team in the tournament) – won 1-0, header from a right-wing corner.

Final against Portugal (the hosts) – won 1-0, header from a right-wing corner.

To beat the holders, the best team and the hosts in successive rounds – by the same scoreline, by scoring in the same way – doesn’t happen by accident. It happens through immense tactical wisdom and careful deployment of tactics to suit each game.

Cast your mind back to 6th October 2001. In the 93rd minute at Old Trafford, David Beckham sent a majestic free-kick over the ball and into the net to secure England’s place in the World Cup Finals at the expense of Germany. Depending on your memory, you might remember that England were playing Greece, and you might remember that actually, England played awfully, struggling to create chances and being outplayed for the entire game.

You probably won’t remember this, but that was Otto Rehhagel’s first game as the manager of Greece. The side was in crisis, but that game showed Rehhagel had an idea of how Greece could beat better teams, by playing a strict man-marking system. They may have only got a draw, but for a team in such an awful situation, it went down in Greece like a victory.

For a side painted as rigid and boring, Greece did brilliantly to adapt their shape to suit different opposing formations – the only constant was to make sure they had a spare man at the back. Against France they set out with what almost a cross between a three- and four- man defence. France played two forward players, and therefore Greece used two man-markers with a sweeper. Trezeguet played centrally and was marshalled by Kapsis, Henry tended to move to the left and therefore the right-back, Seitaridis, stuck to him throughout. The left-back, Fysass, was free to venture forward, whilst the right-sided width came from Zagorakis. Interpretation of the formation the newspapers the next day varied between a three- and four-man defence – but in a way, that was the point. Greece’s system used strict man-marking and was therefore dependent upon the movement of the France players. Since France’s side was so lopsided, Greece’s defence was too.

Meanwhile, playing four relatively central midfielders restricted France’s ability to keep possession. The shape effectively used seven defensive players, but the runs of the Fysass and Zagorakis created their best goalscoring opportunities and meant they attacked with five men, and it was no surprise when Zagorakis provided the cross for the only goal of the game.

They kept a similar shape for the game against the Czechs, who also featured two upfront. Although they were overrun by the Czech’s attacking threat early on, they pulled off the same trick again – Dellas heading home a Silver Goal.

Then, they faced a completely different challenge against Portugal in the final. Portugal played 4-2-3-1 with Pauleta as a lone forward, meaning that had the Greeks kept to a three-man defence, they would have had a surplus of centre-backs and been weak either in midfield, or in wide areas, where the Portuguese full-backs looked to get forward. And so Rehhagel switched to a more traditional four-man defence, retaining a spare man at the back. The full-backs marked Figo and Ronaldo relatively high up the pitch. They matched Portugal 3 v 3 in midfield, with Basinas and Katsouranis sitting deep and Zagorakis providing some kind of attacking presence – although the Greeks missed the real quality on the ball of the suspended Georgios Karagounis and rarely threatened in open play.

Further forward, Vryzas played the lone striker role and held the ball up – and was supported by two players; Stelios Giannakopoulos, a fairly traditional winger who stuck to his flank and forced back the dangerous Portuguese right-back Miguel. The opposite full-back, Nuno Valente, was less of a threat, and so Angelos Charisteas (more of a forward) was fielded tending to play towards that side of the pitch, although he became a forward when Greece had the ball, and right-sided width came from the excellent Seitiaridis.

Could they do it again? Of course they could. Charisteas was again the hero, and Portugal rarely looked like breaking the Greek defence down. For the final 15 minutes, Giannakopoulos was replaced with Stelios Venetidis, a left-back – and Greece effectively sat with eight defenders in front of their box. Felipe Scolari, the Portugal manager, never looked to challenge Greece’s determination of having a spare man at the back – a switch to two forwards may have asked questions, but he brought Nuno Gomes on for Pauleta, rather than changing Portugal’s shape.

Not many teams switch between a three-man and four-man defence so easily, and most managers would have stuck to the “Don’t change a winning team” theory having put out France and the Czechs. But you should change a winning team if the circumstances require it, and Rehhagel believed that as the underdogs, Greece should let their shape be dictated by that of the opposition.

Rehhagel stuck to the two key components of any successful tactical deployment:

Firstly, he played to his own side’s strengths. They had solid, reliable defenders and a hard-working midfield, with little attacking talent. To play open football would have been suicidal. They defended solidly, then countered at speed with numbers – and their set-piece organisation was superb.

Secondly, he changed his team to nullify his opponent’s strengths, and to stifle their main threats. The system against the France and Czechs wouldn’t have worked against the Portuguese, and vice-versa.

He maximised Greece’s strengths and nullifed his opponents’ strengths, to produce the biggest shock in international football history – and that is why this Greece is at #1 on this list.

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